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This paper sets out a new conceptual framework for investigating how city regionalism is 
constituted as a variegated set of geopolitical processes operating within and beyond the 
national state. Our approach highlights: 1) the different forms of territorial politics through 
which city regionalism is conjoined with broader visions of the national state; 2) the material 
and territorial arrangements which support such a conjuncture; and 3) the political actors 
enabling city regionalism and the national state to come together within a geopolitical frame 
of reference.  





I  Introduction  
Processes of city-region building have attracted considerable attention from urban and 
regional scholars. If progress already has been made towards an understanding of the 
processes of agglomeration and accumulation that underpin city-regional growth (Scott, 
2001a; 2001b), researchers have also examined the corresponding structures of collective 
provision and welfare that sustain social reproduction within city regions (Jonas and Ward, 
2007; Etherington and Jones, 2009). Attention is now turning to the political construction of 
city regionalism in different national contexts (Dierwechter, 2008; Hall and Pain, 2006; 
Herrschel and Newman, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose, 2008; Kantor et al., 2012). In so doing 
scholars have exposed the hand of the national state in shaping new city-regional 
configurations of political authority and public administration (Brenner, 2002; Harrison, 
2007; Harrison and Hoyler, 2015). As Storper has put it: 
“City regions also develop in part as a result of politics. They are shaped by national 
policies in different ways, and in turn, they enter into national political and social life 
in a variety of ways that are often not apparent to the naked eye.” (Storper, 2013: 10) 
Whilst the latter approaches promise to deliver fresh theoretical insights into the 
emerging political landscape of city regionalism, surprisingly little has been said about the 
social and political construction of city regions from the perspective of the contested and 
often contradictory geopolitical interests and strategies of the national state (see Harrison, 
2007). If the state is becoming more visible in the literature, research on city regions 
nonetheless continues to foreground economic processes, such as agglomeration, 
accumulation and competition (Florida, 2008; Scott, 2012), at the expense of knowledge of 
how these processes enable the national state to project itself on an international stage. When 
the state has been the focus of investigation, such as in the literature on state rescaling 
(Brenner, 2009), studies demonstrate how neoliberal forms of state intervention map onto city 
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regions but neglect to consider how city regionalism is shaped by territorial politics – both 
domestic and international – operating around the state (Cox, 2009). Even studies of the 
politics of urban development, which recognise that the state’s territorial structure can be a 
focus for all sorts of societal tensions in capitalism (Cox and Jonas, 1993), often fail to 
consider the various ways in which city regionalism both frames and discloses the extra-
territorial practices and discourses of the national state (e.g., competitiveness, security, etc.). 
Consequently, research has underestimated the variety of ways in which city regionalism is 
enacted as a geopolitical project, practice and/or discourse on behalf of the state.  
In this paper, we attempt to fill a gap in knowledge by proposing a new conceptual 
framework for analyzing the variety of ways in which city regionalism gets constituted as a 
set of geopolitical processes within and beyond the national state. Rather than attempting to 
define city regions as political territories that function apart from the state, we conceptualize 
city regionalism as a set of discursively and materially produced acts of political 
regionalization, which can take on multiple forms within and across state borders. In our 
view, city regionalism has become a key focus of geopolitical experimentation and problem 
solving on the part of the national state as it strives to construct a more functional 
transnational statehood for the twenty-first century; indeed it might well be becoming central 
to how the state orchestrates international competitiveness. As such, city regionalism needs to 
be understood not solely as the medium and outcome of territorial reorganizations internal to 
the state – important as these are – but also a decisive moment in the internationalization of 
the state itself.  
In setting out our approach, we conceptualize the state as a constant geopolitical 
process to territorialize political power/authority through a great variety of governmental 
technologies ranging from spatial planning and public administration to economic 
development and education. By means of its concrete powers and functions (e.g., 
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administrative, electoral, technocratic, etc.), the national state increasingly mediates and 
orchestrates accumulation around city regions as part of more general efforts to secure 
economic growth, to generate competitive advantages for factions of capital, and to ensure 
societal order within its territorial jurisdictions. Here we follow Jessop’s notion of the state 
and its constituent powers as made up of “an institutionally and discursively mediated 
condensation…of a changing balance of forces that seek to influence the forms, purposes, 
and content of polity, politics and policy” (Jessop 2016: 10). It is our claim that city 
regionalism is becoming an important medium through which the state exercises its powers in 
the twenty-first century. Whereas in the mid-twentieth century the development of relatively 
self-contained national urban systems was integral to nation-building activities on the part of 
the state, today there is a qualitative change in the manner in which cities and their 
surrounding regions are geopolitically positioned as actors on behalf of the state. In effect, 
city regions – especially mega-city regions − have become integral to the process of 
‘stretching’ state territoriality and competitiveness in line with a global economic order.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we review the 
current state of work on city-region resurgence in order to highlight the variety of ways in 
which the state is (or is not) brought into the analysis. We note an emphasis in the literature 
upon the idea – or even ideal – of a polycentric competition state in which city regionalism is 
somehow becoming detached analytically from knowledge of territorial-political processes 
and pressures on the state, a position that we find to be problematic.  Second, we offer an 
alternative geopolitical reading of city regionalism in which we re-examine city-region 
policies and discourses in relation to underlying dilemmas and processes of state 
territorialization and state internationalization, in particular. Thirdly, we set out an approach 
for analyzing the various ways in which city regionalism is taken up and articulated as a 
geopolitical project. Our approach highlights: 1) the different forms of territorial politics 
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through which city-regionalism is conjoined with broader political, cultural and economic 
visions of the national state in a given context; 2) the material and territorial arrangements, 
including investments in social and physical infrastructure, which support such a conjuncture; 
and 3) the actors and policy discourses that shape the political strategies and experiments 
through which city regionalism and the national state come together within a wider 
geopolitical frame of reference. In the conclusion, we offer a heuristic framework for 
investigating these processes in greater empirical depth, which we anticipate could open up 
opportunities for further research into the geopolitics of city regionalism.   
 
II City regionalism and the territorialization of politics: from the polycentric state to the 
‘geopolitics of capitalism’ 
In this section, we examine three dominant ways in which city regionalism has been 
examined in relation to the state. We argue each perspective is based upon certain 
assumptions about the optimal territorial structure of the state as viewed from the standpoint 
of capital accumulation and competitiveness. When examined individually each reinforces 
claims about the rise to dominance of the ‘competition state’ (see Cerny, 2007). When 
viewed together in a critical light, however, they suggest that the territorial politics shaping 
city regionalism can assume many different forms.  Such perspectives underestimate the 
reciprocal yet diverse ways in which city regionalism and national state territory are co-
constituted.  
 
1 City-regional collaboration in a polycentric state 
In the early 1990s, there was a convergence of academic interest around exposing the 
rise of city regions as new spatial structures of capital accumulation alongside the processes 
shaping their political construction. This convergence was motivated initially by work on the 
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new economic geography, which argued that the new industries driving the global economy 
tended to agglomerate or cluster within large urban regions (Porter, 2001). It prompted 
researchers to identify and delimit competitive city regions on the basis of the presence of 
clusters of industries operating in key growth sectors (e.g., finance, high technology, etc.). 
Crucially, however, this did not mean delimiting city regions in respect to the local 
jurisdictional arrangements of the state. Instead, the secret to unlocking their competitiveness 
was located in the presence or absence of institutions, regulatory arrangements, and 
governance frameworks capable of supporting the economic development of industrial 
clusters and their surrounding urban agglomerations (Scott, 1998; Storper, 1997). Quite early 
on the analysis of city-regional economies and institutions became detached from knowledge 
of state structures and territorial politics. 
Ongoing research into city-regional economies often highlights the national and 
global political significance of expansive urban agglomerations, especially those city regions 
whose territories encompass multiple local political jurisdictions, several metropolitan areas 
and, in a few cases, provinces and even countries. When examined as discrete territorial-
political entities, such highly polycentric city regions are recognized to face all sorts of 
collective-action problems pertaining to public service provision and territorial administration 
(Scott, 2012). However, unlike the self-contained metropolitan forms idealized by earlier 
generations of economists and scholars of public administration (Tiebout, 1956; Bish, 1971; 
Ostrom, 1990), today’s global city regions are sufficiently large and innovative to self-
generate institutional solutions to such problems, including strong models of city-regional 
collaboration. Nevertheless researchers remain preoccupied with matters of economic 
efficiency and competitiveness at the expense of knowledge of state structures and political 
interests, prompting the claim that the hand of the state is to all intents and purposes invisible 
from mainstream economic analysis of city regions (Storper, 2013: 10).  
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To the extent that ideas about the economic and political benefits of city-regional 
collaboration do find their way into public policy, some prior knowledge of territorial politics 
is presumed. As a former Secretary of the United States (US) Department of Housing and 
Urban Development once put it, regional collaboration involves designing governance 
structures that better match ‘things’ (e.g. infrastructure, tax base, etc.) with ‘people’ (citizens, 
businesses, politicians, etc.) (Cisneros, 1995). This is especially the case in the US where city 
regions exhibit deeply-entrenched distributional problems, leading to all sorts of political 
demands on local politicians and regional policy makers for more regionally equitable land 
use and economic development policies (Benner and Pastor, 2011; Wheeler, 2009). In touting 
these new models of city-regional collaboration, national policymakers, think-tanks and 
consultancies in the US nonetheless continue to advocate free-market solutions and principles 
of fiscal federalism rather than national state intervention (Pierce 1993; Katz and Bradley, 
2014). To the extent that the state is brought into this policy discussion it serves to highlight 
differences in national political cultures and institutions. In the European Union (EU), for 
instance, public policy interest in city-regional collaboration has prompted national states to 
strengthen spatial planning and cross-border arrangements (Hall and Pain, 2006), reflecting 
the growing importance of the supranational scale as a political space shaping city 
regionalism in the European context (see Brenner, 2004).  
Despite such increasing sensitivity to differences in national policy contexts, state 
territorial interests and geopolitical processes remain for the most part absent from 
mainstream policy and planning literatures on city regionalism. If anything, research 
continues to highlight examples of major city-regional agglomerations in which local 
political and economic actors have successfully circumnavigated presumed weaknesses in 
national economic planning and state social provision (Hall and Pain, op. cit.; Neuman and 
Hull, 2011; Kantor et al., 2012). The polycentricity of the state is, at best, a recognized part 
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of the policy context but not an explanatory vehicle in its own right. The same applies to the 
literature on urban economics which deals with agglomeration and the related economic 
performance of city regions. More often than not, urban economists take for granted city 
regions as statistical areas which are detached from wider state spaces (see, e.g., Glaeser and 
Resseger, 2010). In sum, there is little corresponding analysis of the role of the state in 
orchestrating, steering, or otherwise sustaining city-regional policy and governance processes 
(Jessop, 1998). As such, the new economic geography of city regions is predicated on a 
somewhat restricted understanding of the “technological and organizational worlds that make 
regions” (Storper, 1997: 48).  
 
2 The rise of global city regions and its geopolitical consequences 
A second important theme is how the literature approaches the relationship between 
city regionalism and state territorial organization from the vantage point of global 
urbanization processes. Received models of urban spatial structure (e.g., the Chicago School 
of Urban Ecology) imaged urban territory developing outwards from a given urban centre, 
forming neat concentric zones, regular polycentric settlement systems, and nested urban 
hierarchies. Although such models captured certain spatial patterns of growth deemed 
characteristic of urbanization in Western Europe and North America during the early-to-mid 
twentieth century, nowadays urbanization has spread far beyond the political boundaries of 
the central city and its surrounding suburbs, and even those of the wider administrative 
region. Whereas the ‘city region’ concept first appeared in regional planning in the early 
twentieth century (Hall, 2009), we are now in the midst of a period in which the concept is 
being remoulded and stretched in order to fit better the processes and patterns of urban 




In seeking to capture these trends, the concept of regional urbanization refers to how 
capital accumulation takes place around mega-urban agglomerations, whose growing political 
influence threatens the sovereignty of the nation state (Soja, 2011). The concept further 
implies a shift underway from the organized (i.e. state-centred) capitalism of the post-World 
War II era to the contemporary de-territorialized form of global capitalism, which is 
characterized by an enhanced political authority of global city regions and a correspondingly 
weakened sovereign political autonomy of the territorial state. Scott (2001b: 813–814), for 
instance, has referred to the global city region “as an emerging political-economic unit with 
increasing autonomy of action on the national and world stages” which is “becoming 
increasingly central to the conduct and coordination of modern life”. 
The rise of mega-urban agglomerations was anticipated in Jean Gottman’s description 
of Megalopolis, an imaginary term used to describe an urban agglomeration stretching from 
Washington, DC, to New York and Boston on the east coast of the USA (Gottmann, 1961; 
see Harrison and Hoyler, 2015).  In revisiting Gottman’s thesis, it is not suggested that urban 
development is driven primarily by the locational needs of Fordist manufacturing (as was the 
case in the 1950s and ‘60s); nor are the variable costs of transporting goods and people a 
major constraint on regional economic development today. Rather the process of regional 
urbanization captures the idea that today’s mega-urban agglomerations are comprised of 
multiple employment nodes, which are interconnected regionally through extended labour 
markets or infrastructures, as well as globally through networks and flows of knowledge, 
information, and capital (Castells, 2000).  
These global city-region networks and their supporting industrial agglomerations 
represent a significant threat to models of economic growth based around the assumption that 
cities operate in relatively self-contained national urban systems or, as Florida (2008: 42) has 
put it, “...bigger and more competitive economic units – mega-regions – have superceded 
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cities as the real engines of the global economy” (see also Jacobs, 1984). So pervasive is the 
new territorial imaginary of the global city region that scholars are even referring to the 
possibility of a profound geopolitical shift in the world system from sovereign territorial 
states to city networks within which a sort of ‘paradiplomacy’ is practised (see Keating, 
1999). Taylor (2011: 201) states revealingly how: 
“The prime governance instrument of the modern world-system has been the inter-
state system based upon mutually recognized sovereignties of territorial polities. It is 
possible that we are just beginning to experience an erosion of territorial sovereignties 
and their replacement by new mutualities expressed through city networks. This is 
what the rise of globalization as a contemporary, dominant ‘key word’ might be 
heralding.” 
Such a profoundly geopolitical view of the contemporary urban condition has been widely 
adopted and implemented in policy-making across different national contexts. Many 
governments in different parts of the world have sought to connect the state with newly-
conceived mega-urban formations that are supposed to transcend state borders. These spatial 
formations are not just of intellectual curiosity; rather the relational imaginaries and territorial 
indicators used to describe such formations increasingly guide policy-making and planning 
practice within the host territorial states (cf. Ohmae 1993; see Harrison and Hoyler, 2015).  
As the city-region concept becomes enrolled in the service of the state, it is in turn 
adapted and moulded to fit the state’s wider policy agendas. For example, the idea of mega-
urban regions offers a strategic policy impetus especially to those national state governments 
that do not host major metropolitan areas within their territory. These governments therefore 
strive to ‘mega-regionalize’ themselves as a strategy to overcome their preconceived 
disadvantages in respect of international competition. It is also noticeable how the idea of 
mega-urban regions has been orchestrated by international organizations, supranational 
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polities, and global consultancies. For instance, the EU has promulgated the idea of mega-
urban regionalism as a means to enhance economic competitiveness, thereby furthering the 
internationalization strategies of its member nation states (Moisio, 2011a; 2011b).   
Superficially the rise of mega-urban regions with the capacity to supplant the nation 
state (and the wider state system) makes for an appealing argument; but it conveniently 
ignores the geopolitical significance of the national and transnational regulatory topologies 
sustaining these new mega city-region territorial formations. It fails to recognise that both the 
nation state and the city region are historically contingent political and social constructs, the 
development of which is bound up in historical struggles over social order and capital 
accumulation. Hitherto state theorists such as Poulantzas had argued that the presence of a 
dominant metropolitan centre in a national territory portends the rise of new forms of 
territorial politics around, variously, regionalism and transnationalism; a politics that is 
nevertheless deeply permeated by class struggles (see Poulantzas, 1998). Given the enduring 
efficacy of such territorial politics, any claim that the rise of global city regions necessarily 
undermines the nation state warrants careful scrutiny since other possibilities cannot be 
discounted out-of-hand. Instead we suggest that the rise of city-regionalism is a geopolitically 
significant yet historically contingent moment in the development of global capitalism, which 
brings us to a third theme in the literature.  
 
3 City regionalism as state rescaling  
This third theme arises from a reading of the literature on state rescaling (see Brenner, 
2009). This corpus of work claims that the rise of city regionalism is closely associated with 
the spatial dictates and crises tendencies of the capitalist mode of production and, more 
specifically, with uneven development arising from the spatial concentration of global 
finance within city regions. It follows that the political construction of the city region as a 
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‘new state space’ (Brenner, 2004) reflects not so much economic inefficiencies operating 
inside city regions as it does larger-scale political-economic logics and contradictions, not 
least the need to construct new scales of social regulation and capital accumulation through 
neo-liberal policy measures. From this perspective, efforts to bolster the competitiveness of 
city regions represent, in effect, a struggle for the political and economic control of capitalism 
at a new spatial scale extending well beyond the territorial confines of a given metropolitan 
area (see Wachsmuth, 2015).  
From this vantage point, moreover, city regionalism is closely linked with the idea of 
a ‘spatial fix’ (see Harvey, 1982) or, in other words, a specific system of accumulation that 
centres upon state and governance processes operating around urban regions (Jessop, 2000: 
335–336). This city-regional fix, moreover, is constructed upon an apolitical ‘general 
interest’  ̶  often articulated as the ‘national interest’  ̶  which endorses selected ways of 
thinking and acting on economic growth, and marginalizes others. In so doing, the fix 
facilitates “the deferral and displacement of contradictions, crisis-tendencies, and conflicts to 
the benefit of those fully included in the ‘general interest’ at the expense of those who are 
more or less excluded from it” (Jessop, 2008: 1). The spatial fix, therefore, reflects and 
discloses the ongoing social processes and power relations underpinning the territorial 
organization of the state.  As such, a crucial consideration is the different ways in which city 
regionalism becomes enrolled around the conflicting state strategies associated with the 
‘geopolitics of capitalism’ (Harvey, 1985).  
The rise of city regionalism is often marshalled as evidence of the ‘downscaling’ of 
state power alongside the ‘upscaling’ of social-regulatory institutions in line with the global 
territorial reach of capitalist firms and institutions. Yet city regionalism is never solely a 
downscaling of state power because the national state is always self-interested in managing 
both its internal territoriality and also its extra-territorial reach. Sometimes this works in 
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response to local social and political interests, in which case it is important to investigate how 
members of the ‘growth coalition’ stand to gain or lose from the different state territorial 
arrangements that emerge within and around metropolitan areas (see Cox, 2011). On other 
occasions, city regionalism can in fact be integral to the internationalization of the state itself; 
across the world, many of the attempts to construct a ‘global city’ are bound to the processes 
of state spatial reconfiguration (e.g., Kangas, 2013). In other words, mega-urban 
agglomerations are identified not only to be the leading motors of global economic 
development but also particular strategic spaces for national states rather than city regions (or 
their constituent ‘growth coalitions’) to enter an imagined ‘global sphere’ within which 
certain segments of people, factions of capital (especially finance), and economically 
powerful ideas are understood to circulate. Rather than undermining (or being undermined 
by) the national state, the political orchestration of city regionalism on an international stage 
can in fact  reveal a lot about how the state seeks to reorganize its territorial structure in order 
to attract global investment and ensure the economic development of its most politically 
privileged urban centres (Jonas, 2013).  
 
III Towards city regionalism as geopolitical processes 
To summarize the above discussion, we have identified three ways in which the state 
is examined in relation to the rise of city regions. First, some argue that city regionalism is an 
outgrowth of a polycentric settlement system, a development that poses challenges for 
territorial structures of economic governance which address issues of economic efficiency 
and collective action. Second, there are those diverse perspectives that highlight the rise of 
city regions in a global context, a development which appears to signal not only the demise of 
the nation state and the global system of territorial states but also the gradual replacement of 
inter-state territorial competition by inter-city rivalries. Finally, for others city regionalism 
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represents a decisive moment in the territorial reorganization and rescaling of the state, 
contributing to a globally imbricated economic and social order (Brenner, 2013). Each 
approach offers useful insights into how one might conceptualize city regionalism in relation 
to the state; yet each in turn begs questions about the role of geopolitics in shaping city 
regionalism.  
Building on these critical observations, we now highlight the importance of exposing 
city regionalism as a set of geopolitical processes; the insurmountable diversity of city 
regionalism is generated in these processes, and the ‘urban worlds’ so constituted become 
crucial constituents of state spaces. We thus claim that city regionalism has important 
implications for reconfiguration of national state territoriality, and that city regionalism needs 
to be understood in the context of national state spatial transformation rather than its demise. 
The task is to identify and investigate the variegated processes through which city 
regionalism is produced and re-produced through the state by various societal forces which 
bring together the economy and society in different geopolitical tapestries. Such a perspective 
underlines the modern state’s need to territorialize urban order both within and also outwith 
its borders. This effort has not withered away due to globalization or the rise of the global 
knowledge-based economy, even if one may argue that the capacity of the government to 
practice such a territorialization has qualitatively altered.  
During the twentieth century, the state territorialized economic space around a 
constellation of national urban centres and systems in the context of social policies and 
practices related to the ‘national economy’. Consider, for instance, how city regionalism was 
a constitutive element of the so-called Rhine-model of state-capitalism that was predicated on 
particular ‘social’ state interventionism (the demand-side regulation), and collective and 
egalitarian decision-making (e.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001). In such a Keynesian-Fordist 
context, metropolitanism underpinned a geopolitics of security and coherence, which was 
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geared around the ‘national’ as the primary locus of political virtue. Territorial ideas and 
discourses based around functional ‘metropolitan areas’ or ‘city regions’ were nationalized 
and codified by the state through political symbolism, urban policy, and national planning. 
Albeit such processes often worked out differently within specific national contexts, 
depending on the geopolitical priorities and interests of Cold War-era security states.  
Consider in this regard the rise of a metropolitan polity in the US context. The 
expansion of metropolitan regions, and thus the birth of particular ‘American’ variety of 
metropolitan regionalism during the Cold War, was partly based on channelling population 
and resources into larger urban areas (e.g., of the Sunbelt states) through a heavy support by 
the federal government in the form of federally-regulated road construction and secured home 
loans through which city regions emerged. Both of these governmental interventions were 
predicated on US military and security policies (Gillham, 2002), which furthered the genesis 
of metropolitan regionalism. Throughout the Cold War, geopolitical discourses of national 
security and state territorial integrity legitimated the raising of US federal and state taxes (e.g. 
the gasoline tax) for inter-urban highway spending, which in turn fostered further urban 
sprawl and metropolitan political fragmentation, eventually triggering strident calls for new 
models of regional collaboration. Now compare these developments to debates in the 
European context. Even though some supranational polities, most notably the EU, have 
recently sought to generate an EU-wide polycentric urban order, thereby challenging state-
centred urban hierarchies, these efforts have remained modest (Moisio, 2011b). Be that as it 
may, institutional change and experimentation in multiple registers are significant aspects of 
the new geopolitics of city regionalism and the associated genesis of new state spaces. 
There are at least three important aspects of seeing city regionalism as a central part 
of a wider set of geopolitical processes. Firstly, attempts by the national state to orchestrate 
city regionalism centrally ‘from above’ (see Harrison, 2008) require some understanding of 
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the specific nature of national political issues involved, be these issues of fiscal distribution, 
settlement, citizenship, identity, or some other facet of what might be called the ‘national 
question’. Second, there is the matter of how the state gives material support to city 
regionalism in the forms of investments in social and physical infrastructures, and how in 
turn these investments and institutional arrangements are given legitimacy by geopolitical 
discourses.  
Thirdly, there is the question of what actors – state and non-state – are involved in 
orchestrating city regionalism internationally.  Here we need to establish more precisely 
which economic and political actors speak and act on behalf of city regions, perhaps by 
drawing down the aforementioned infrastructural investments or developing stronger 
relationships between city regions, supranational regulatory structures, and flows of global 
finance. While such actors often operate as ‘regional spokespersons’ (Metzger, 2013), the 
whole issue of political ‘actorness’ in the context of city regionalism should be understood as 
operating not just at the regional scale but also nationally and internationally. Further 
research is required into the ways in which business organizations, state departments, 
investment consortia, private firms, and public institutions (e.g., regional councils or city 
administrations), as well as individuals, consultants, and transnational academic gurus, 
actively construct the discursive and material practices of city regionalism. Precisely how 
these actors develop bodies of expertise around the issue of city regionalism in particular 
spatial and temporal contexts is a crucial research question informing the geopolitical 
analysis of city regionalism.   
 
IV A framework for analyzing the geopolitics of city regionalism 
This section discusses some examples as a prelude to proposing a heuristic framework 
for analyzing city regionalism as a set of geopolitical processes. Important to our argument is 
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a need to understand the co-constitution of efforts to define and delimit city regions as 
material spaces, political structures, and/or discursive formations. Rather than reinforcing the 
duality between the national state and the city region, our perspective highlights the coming 
together of the state and city regionalism as a set of geopolitical processes which can be 
empirically analyzed. In order to simplify the discussion, we highlight three geopolitical 
aspects of the relationship between city regionalism and the state as follows: 1) the 
territorializing processes in which city regionalism is conjoined with broader political, 
cultural and economic visions of the national state in a given context; 2) the material 
arrangements that characterize such conjoining; and 3) the actors (and their capacities to act) 
which play a crucial role formulating the political strategies/experiments in which city-
regionalism and the national state come together.  
 
1 City regionalism and the national question 
Given the powerful economic imaginaries circulating through the global knowledge-
based economy, the need to tailor policies around city regionalism has become an important 
strategy to modify national economic strategies and institutions, modes of governance, and 
indeed the very form of the state. Contemporary approaches to city regionalism often choose 
to focus on how the reconfiguration of sub-national spaces of the state enhances global 
economic competitiveness and mitigates for national deficits in the societal regulation of 
capitalism. However, such approaches are based on the questionable assumption that city 
regions are functional economic spaces whereas the nation state is becoming dysfunctional 
(e.g., for maintaining societal order necessary for accumulation). In fact, by enrolling the 
city-region concept around domestic political projects, the national state has quite a potent 
weapon in its already extensive armoury of policy ideas and practices for dealing with 
pressing national problems, including but not limited to those relating to economic 
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competiveness and societal regulation. Depending on the context, the geopolitical reordering 
of national political space around city regions can be seen, variously, as a vehicle for 
promoting state territorial redistribution, addressing regional imbalances in economic and 
political power, maintaining the national socio-political order, or facilitating national 
planning and settlement. Our approach thus invites due consideration of the great variety of 
ways in which city regionalism assists the state in addressing the national question.  
Take, for example, the UK where the city-region concept has already informed 
national economic policy but now increasingly plays into various national political problems 
and strategies. In the early 2000s, city regionalism was deployed by the national Labour 
government as a policy tool designed to counterbalance the dominance of London and the 
South East region of England in national economic decision making (ODPM, 2006; Harding, 
2007). The major regional cities (e.g., Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, etc.) were encouraged 
to organize around a lobby group, the Core Cities, which was encouraged to secure so-called 
‘city deals’ involving a limited devolution of powers for economic development to the city 
regions. This process has continued under a new national Conservative government. For 
example, in July 2014 the civic leaders of Greater Manchester signed an agreement with the 
UK Chancellor of the Exchequor, George Osborne, to create the first directly elected metro-
wide mayor outside London having powers over transport, economic development and 
policing. Other ‘city deals’ have since followed. 
In the meantime, however, the political landscape of city regionalism in the UK has 
been transformed by the devolution question in Scotland. Prior to the Scottish referendum 
held in 2014, and fearful of a vote in favour of Scotland becoming an independent country, 
three major national political parties in the UK promised to devolve more power to the 
regions, a promise which in turn intensified demands to devolve more powers to the English 
city regions. The ruling Conservative national government has since identified the ‘northern 
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powerhouse’ as a potential city-region solution for England, not only to the problem of 
regional economic imbalance, but also that of political devolution:  
“We have a comprehensive plan to rebalance the economy and create a northern 
powerhouse by bringing together the great cities and counties of the north of England, 
alongside plans to support other vital economies in our country, such as the south-
west. Those plans involve major investment in transport infrastructure, backing 
science and skills, and supporting local businesses. The centrepiece of the northern 
powerhouse is the commitment to a major transfer of power to our great cities and 
counties so that local people can take more control of the decisions that affect them.” 
(George Osborne cited in Hansard, 2015)  
Where the territorial boundaries of the ‘northern powerhouse’ are drawn (if at all) has been a 
matter of political debate in the UK parliament. Nevertheless, it serves to illustrate how a 
quite specific economic debate about city regionalism has been transformed around a much 
wider set of political and discursive strategies, which are designed to address pressing 
territorial-political problems inside the UK state, not the least of which is the ‘national’ 
question.(1)  
 The UK devolution question suggests that it is sometimes useful to draw a distinction 
between the political construction of city regionalism as an electoral project undertaken on 
behalf of a national political party, on the one hand, and the idea that city regionalism might 
embody national settlement goals and imaginaries, on the other. This latter form of territorial 
politics is most apparent in states where national structures of urban planning and economic 
growth reflect the settlement policies of the national state, as is the case in Israel (Kirby and 
Abu Rass, 1999). Since 1948, the Israeli planning system has served not only as a tool for 
promoting Jewish settlement in the different regions of Israel but also a strategy to promote 
the nation-building objectives of the State of Israel and, in doing so, control the country’s 
20 
 
Palestinian minority. In this and in other respects, efforts undertaken on behalf of the state to 
promote the reconfiguration of a country’s internal settlement systems, including those that 
involve consolidating cities with their surrounding administrative regions, often have 
profound national and international political ramifications, especially in places where 
struggles around race, religion, and/or identity have shaped the structures, institutions and 
patterns of urban development (Cochrane and Jonas, 1999), or where national independence 
movements remain strong (e.g., the Basque region and Catalunya in Spain).  
Our approach to city regionalism further invites investigations of the relationship 
between national economic development and the wider geopolitical practices and imaginaries 
of the nation state. Evidence from research in countries such as Australia (McGuirk, 2007), 
South Korea (Park, 2008) and Malaysia (Roy, 2009) suggests that city regions play a strategic 
role in constructing new imaginaries of national economic development. Often this requires 
that the state selects certain city regions – usually the primate city and perhaps also the 
national capital (these might be the same places but not necessarily so) – as privileged 
locations for strategic investments in infrastructure, social provision, and culture (e.g., Kuala 
Lumpur in the case of Malaysia, Seoul in Korea, and Sydney in Australia). Here, too, the 
imaginary of the ‘metropolis state’ (Moisio, 2008) – whereby certain city regions are 
seemingly better able to articulate and represent a vision or ideal of how the nation can 
compete and prosper on an international stage – is pertinent. Of course, that vision is itself 
subject to political negotiation and contestation over time as can be illustrated by the case of 
Finland, which has been in a transition process from decentralized welfare state, to 
decentralized competition state, and eventually to a metropolis state. In the latter context, the 
future of the state is bound to the capacity of the state to anchor itself to the imagined global 
sphere through a few city regions (Moisio and Paasi, 2013) as well as particular spaces within 
these (Moisio and Kangas, 2016). 
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It is quite notable that Finland’s Ministry of Finance and its ministerial allies have 
formed a geopolitical power coalition which guides the reconstruction of state spatiality 
through city regionalism. The geopolitical vision of this coalition gets its power from the 
discourses of the global knowledge-based economy (e.g., Government of Finland, 2009; 
2014). Together with the equally important political discourses of austerity, such discourses 
inform reforms that seek to locate the state at the epicenter of the conceived global networks 
but also make possible a more efficient and cost-effective welfare state. The following quote 
is exemplary, not exceptional:  
“… good economic growth and employment most likely require urbanization and 
regional concentration which is much more intensive than earlier […] The recent 
economic research supports strongly an idea that future’s growth engines will indeed be 
found in large and diverse cities. Urbanization and concentration are most likely 
untapped assets for Finland, assets which are now badly needed. The benefits of 
regional concentration are large in the light of research. When people equipped with 
particular abilities gather together the average productivity of all improves […] 
Future’s wealth will be found in growing metropolises, and the more we have such 
metropolises, the more we have wealth which the decision makers can re-distribute also 
to peripheries of Finland.” (Vartiainen, 2014: 12–13, trans. from Finnish) 
If certain city regions are thus discursively represented as ‘global’ because their 
perceived economic reach stretches far beyond national state boundaries, in other respects 
city-regionalist discourses simultaneously reflect inherently national political problems and 
imaginaries. The Finnish case illustrates how a growing emphasis on city regionalism is part 
of prioritizing ‘wealth creation’ in the face of the purported threat of international 
competition. The establishment of powerful and networked city regions having an 
international reach thus become central to national imaginaries of economic success, social 
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redistribution and welfare. In a similar vein, albeit from a global South perspective, Roy 
(2009) suggests that the rise of the mega-city region helps to foster quite nationalist(ic) 
developmental imaginaries, such as those of the aspirational nation forging its way into a 
brighter, better, and more global future (on Taiwan, see Lee, 2015).  Our analysis provokes 
the question as to whether such increasingly dominant – at times even nationalistic – political 
imaginaries associated with city regionalism resonate alongside, or perhaps come into 
conflict with, the corresponding geo-economic practices associated with the assumed political 
demise of the nation state.    
 
2 Materialities of city regionalism: geopolitics of competition and social investment  
With a few exceptions (e.g., Ward and Jonas, 2004; Keil and Adie, 2015) the 
literature on city regionalism has had surprisingly little to say about the geopolitical practices, 
governance technologies and policy arrangements that are used by the state to manage spaces 
of social investment and collective provision. Yet decisions in respect of where to invest in 
all sorts of social and physical infrastructures are quite central to how the state organizes and 
manages territorial politics simultaneously internal and external to its borders. Therefore 
which city regions are deemed to qualify for such investments can say a lot about the 
geopolitical priorities of the state. We now consider how the state deploys city regionalism as 
a geopolitical strategy for managing competition and social investment. As before, we are 
interested in the specific city-region practices, knowledges, actors and imaginaries supporting 
these arrangements. 
The policy landscape shaping material investments in city regions is replete with all 
sorts of territorial practices and imaginaries, many of which are geared not just to a domestic 
audience but also international organizations, such as global investment consortia. On the one 
hand, decisions about where to build transportation systems, enhance urban mobility, invest 
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in ‘smart city’ infrastructure or develop logistics around ‘multimedia supercorridors’ and 
‘global gateways’ comfortably resonate with the state’s internationalization agenda. On the 
other hand, such ongoing investments in fixed capital and infrastructure can reinforce 
regional inequalities, which feed into a domestic politics of territorial distribution. Given 
these conflicting geopolitical processes, it is necessary for the state to deploy sophisticated 
technologies of governance for managing its spaces of social investment and competition. 
The specific manner in which the city-region idea is mobilized is central to how the state 
manages these conflicting priorities in respect of investment in social and physical 
infrastructure.  
Under Fordism-Keynesianism, the state’s role in supporting accumulation involved a 
certain form of technocratic thinking about state territory as a single functional space in 
which cities could be connected by national transportation systems (motorways, freeways, 
autobahns, single-gauge rail networks, etc.). The decline of collective provision by the 
Keynesian welfare state and the rise of more fragmented modes of delivering infrastructure 
have undermined this ‘Keynesian myth’ (Radice, 1984) of a semi-fixed national geography, 
throwing into sharp perspective ensuing political struggles around the scalar distribution of 
state capacities for urban development and social provision (Cox and Jonas, 1993).  City 
regionalism potentially offers a technocratic means of managing these struggles. For 
example, state support for certain city regions can give credence to corresponding calls for 
investments in selective improvements in inter-urban connections across state territory (e.g., 
high-speed rail corridors, digital highways, etc.). Recent years has seen all sorts of new city-
regional configurations of the administrative structures of the state devoted to delivering 
investments in transport systems and related infrastructures (Addie, 2013; Enright, 2015). At 
the same time, however, the state continues to confront demands to improve the security of 
its citizens against various perceived ‘external’ threats (e.g. terrorism, climate change, etc.), 
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which often means bolstering investment in the national capital. In this respect, the analysis 
of city regionalism can shed a powerful light on the technologies of governance used by the 
state to manage not just social and physical infrastructural investments but also perceived 
geopolitical risks within/to its territory.  
Since the global financial crisis of 2007-8 the economic development priorities of the 
state have focussed specifically on how investments in social and physical infrastructure can 
be offset against future financial risks and thereby stimulate sustainable national economic 
recovery. Here supranational organizations can and do play a crucial role in assisting states in 
identifying those city region territories that are deemed to ‘safe bets’ from the standpoint of 
financial risk, geopolitical security, climate change, sustainability, and so forth. For instance, 
there have been growing calls by international organizations, such as the United Nations 
(UN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for 
strengthened models of territorial governance at the city-region scale. Whereas the UN has 
enrolled private and public interests around principles for responsible investment (e.g., for 
major urban infrastructure projects) (UNPRI, 2015), the OECD has talked up the role of 
mega-city regions as territorial units of competiveness and sustainable development. In its 
Territorial Reviews, the OECD has documented the growth and investment performance of 
city regions as measured against a range of economic and social indicators (see, e.g., OECD, 
2006; 2015). Underpinning such reports is the argument – often quite explicit – that an overly 
polycentric state can sometimes be a deterrent to global investors. In making this apparently 
counterintuitive link between political fragmentation and underinvestment in social 
infrastructure, supranational organizations lend credence to claims that strong models of city-
regional collaboration are a required for securing investments in social and physical 
infrastructure. Such claims would be inconceivable without explicit knowledge of how the 
state operates within a geopolitical frame of reference. 
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 Supranational organizations help the state to prepare the ground for global financiers, 
land developers, infrastructure firms, and other agents that invest in city regions. Such global 
investment consortia derive income from fixed equity-based investments and assets, such as 
infrastructure, residential land and property, and commercial real estate. These investments 
are often located in a city region or, in the case of larger holdings, are spread across more 
than one city region, the territorial limits of which accordingly can become stretched and 
redefined to suit investor interests. Such investments, being tied to particular (local) state 
territories, represent a fixed asset class whose value depends on harnessing revenue as capital 
circulates through the city-regional economy and built environment. In this context, 
investment consortia promote all sorts of territorial imaginaries as part of ongoing efforts to 
position their host city regions more favourably in relation to wider circuits of state social and 
physical investment. A case-in-point is Peel Holdings’ use of the imaginary of the Atlantic 
Gateway to describe its business strategy for the Liverpool/Manchester city region in the UK 
(Harrison, 2014).  Such overt orchestration of city regionalism internationally, in turn, raises 
questions about how we should identify and investigate the specific interests and actors who 
speak for city regions in a global context. 
3 City-region political actors: constructing transnational bridges  
We now briefly consider the role of different economic and political actors in using 
city regionalism to promote the state on an international stage. The territorialization of the 
state around city regions is bound up with quite broad and yet also competing and conflicting 
visions and ideas, which are conveyed by all sorts of political and economic actors having 
different capacities to act. Such actors and in turn their actions and words orientate the 
various ways in which city regionalism can be understood as a political and economic 
strategy. Storper has eloquently argued that the most economically successful city regions 
tend to be those that develop bonds between economic and political actors that can override 
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the tensions and political schisms caused by metropolitan political fragmentation (Storper, 
2013: 120-125). One might therefore anticipate that the presence of local actors involved in 
the development of strong mechanisms of regional collaboration within city regions is a 
necessary condition for addressing problems of collective action. But is it always a sufficient 
condition? Our preliminary answer to this is ‘no’ insofar as there must also be a plethora of 
institutions and agencies outwith a city region, which in effect ‘speak’ for the city region with 
respect to state spatial developments.  
A variety of actors mediate between city regions and national and international 
regulatory structures; these include politicians, consultants, business consortia, public-private 
partnerships, transnational firms, investors, and supranational organizations. These actors – 
the transnational bridging agents of city regionalism – play a crucial role in positioning city 
regions in national and international strategies of spatial development. Consider, for instance, 
the recent outcry by the chief executive officer of one of the leading multinational 
corporations in Finland concerning the need to construe the Finnish state increasingly around 
city regions in order to survive in global economic competition (Raeste, 2016). Such 
transnational bridging agents not only play an important role in cementing a material 
economic connection between the city regions and global sources of capital investment but 
they also increasingly operate on behalf of the state in internationally orchestrating city 
regionalism. In these respects, city regionalism creates a political action space for different 
actors to vision, measure and assess new state spatial configurations. 
The globalization of city regionalism has been greatly influenced by transnational 
policy fashions; and these policies would not circulate internationally without the knowledges 
held by transnational bridging agents. In recent years, city regionalism has been firmly 
anchored to, and is constituted through, the increasingly powerful circuits of fast policy 
development and experimentation. These experimentations have been instigated in particular 
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by “epistemic communities of experts, practitioners and advocates” (cf. Brenner et al., 2010: 
216). The aforementioned example of regional collaboration (viz. the new regionalism) is a 
case-in-point. Some of these regionalist experimentations have been shown to have limited 
purchase beyond their host states, regions and urban political jurisdictions (Jonas and Pincetl, 
2006); but their relative effectiveness in other contexts does not come as revelation given that 
the recent round of state transformation has been more generally characterized by the 
increasing power of all sorts of consultants in the practices of state apparatus (Prince, 2012). 
They are part of larger transnational networks of “like-minded technocrats” (Peck, 2001: 
451), which operate in the name of the state through various channels. The actors of these 
networks have notable capacities to frame value-based political choices and thus set city-
regional policy agendas, for instance, through production of ‘evidence-based’ knowledge 
(Ahlqvist and Moisio, 2014). 
One of the remaining challenges is to analyze the geopolitical formation of city 
regionalism through the lens of transnational policy mobility. Both the inherited institutional 
landscapes of the state and the transnational fields of inter-spatial policy transfer should be 
taken into account in an analysis of the political construction of city regionalism in a 
particular state context. In other words, as a geopolitical process of state transformation city 
regionalism has been gradually re-worked through a series of smaller or larger experimental 
practices in which Keynesian-national territorial structures of the welfare state have been 
transformed around, if not entirely replaced by, new state structures (see Golubchikov et al., 
2014). In this process, the inherited territorial/institutional structures of the state have been 
gradually re-worked through a peculiar ‘Porterian-Floridian’ geopolitical rationality (see 





This paper has set out an approach to city regions that gives priority to their 
geopolitical construction in the context of the national state. This approach is summarized in 
Table 1 in which we identify three framing research questions. Each of these questions 
invites an investigation of the different geopolitical processes that align city regionalism with 
the interests of the state. Each in turn is associated with specific state territorial-institutional 
structures, economic and political actors, geopolitical practices, and city-region knowledges 
and imaginaries. This heuristic framework is designed to provoke further detailed empirical 
research into the different forms of territorial politics through which city regionalism is 
conjoined with broader national state objectives within a wider geopolitical frame of 
reference.  
+++ insert Table 1 about here +++ 
Our approach is inspired by ongoing research into the different ways in which city 
regionalism is politically constituted within the national state. For example, Harrison (2010) 
has shown that, whilst city regionalism remains premised on ideas of economic growth, 
efforts to mark out these city regions as territories has been conditioned and constrained by 
existing state administrative boundaries and associated traditions of making claims to 
territorial space. Accordingly, the territorial politics shaping city regionalism can either be 
centrally orchestrated by the state or, alternatively, regionally orchestrated by non-state 
interests (Harrison, 2008). Likewise state spatial theorists have emphasised how state 
rescaling around city regions manifests a struggle to find new territorial solutions – spatial 
fixes – to crisis tendencies in neoliberal capitalism (Brenner, 2004). What distinguishes our 
approach from these perspectives, as well as others likewise interested in politically mapping 
city regions in relation to the state, is the desire to interrogate city regionalism as a more 
diverse set of territorial-political processes through which national state interests are 
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orchestrated; moreover, these processes operate domestically and, crucially, also 
internationally.  
Our call for researchers to address the co-constitution of the state and city regionalism 
within a geopolitical framework arises out of claims that capitalism is in decisive moment in 
terms of the underpinning state territorial organization and the heightening importance of 
internationally-orchestrated city regionalism. However, rather than comprehending such city 
regionalism as unravelling the global system based on sovereign nation states (Jessop et al., 
2008), or suggesting that topological representations of political processes are superior to 
their territorial counterparts (cf. Allen and Cochrane, 2007; Morgan, 2007), we have outlined 
an approach to understanding how particular territorial-political processes, material structures 
and actors are involved in promoting city regionalism. Each, in turn, contributes to the 
incessant territorialization and re-territorialization practices of the state at large. As such the 
many and varied efforts to organize, manage and transform state territories around city 
regions disclose wider geopolitical rationalities and knowledges, not least those involved in 
repositioning the national state in regard to international competitiveness. 
In our view, city-regionalism is a contingent expression of wider territorial-political 
dilemmas confronting the national state which are partly informed by, but not reducible to, 
global neoliberal logics of economic growth and competition. We accept that global 
capitalism could be at a decisive moment in terms of its underpinning state territorial 
organization and, as a crucial part of this, city regionalism occupies an increasingly central 
place in the wider geopolitical calculus of the state. However, we have offered a different 
perspective on these developments. Through its various efforts to organise, manage and 
transform national territory around city regions, the national state is seemingly better able to 
achieve external objectives in regard to competitiveness even as it confronts ongoing 
territorial-political problems and tensions within its borders. We are not claiming that city 
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regionalism represents a step-change in the scale of urbanization and territorial organization, 
one which can somehow be separated from the existing geopolitical configuration of the 
global economic order. Instead, we suggest that city-regionalism has assumed a geopolitical 
significance which is best understood as an historically contingent moment in the 
development of global capitalism.  
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Notes 
1. In the UK, the national question – specifically, the failure of the UK state to use city 
regionalism to rebalance the economy − has become even more vexed in light of the 
June 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. A narrow margin in favour 
of Brexit (a proposal that the UK should leave the EU) has exposed a territorial division 
within the national electorate between, on the one hand, voters in London and the South 
East region who favoured remaining in the EU and, on the other, those in the provincial 
English cities and regions who voted for leaving. A clear majority of voters in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland expressed a preference to remain in the EU. 
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